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KEYNOTE ADDRESS 
14TH ANNUAL CONFERENCE ON LITIGATING TAKINGS 
CHALLENGES TO LAND USE AND ENVIRONMENTAL 
REGULATIONS 
Dean William Treanor*† 
 Thanks very much, Peter.1 I’m humbled. Peter and John2 brought me to 
Georgetown for the first time. I spoke at this conference the last time it was 
at Georgetown, which I think was 1998. I’m delighted to now be Peter’s 
colleague. He is an extraordinary scholar and teacher, and he has 
profoundly influenced the development of this field. And I’ve been 
delighted to watch John’s career at Georgetown and now at Vermont, as his 
powerful influence as a scholar and teacher continues to grow as the years 
pass. Both of them are visionaries and we’re all in their debt. And this 
conference is extraordinary. When Peter and John asked me if I would 
deliver this keynote address, I jumped at the opportunity. 
 As Peter told you, I’ve been thinking about the Takings Clause since 
1983. So, to have the opportunity to talk to a group of the leading 
academics and leading practitioners in the field, people who are shaping 
takings law, is a remarkable opportunity. I would like to talk today about 
my conception of the Takings Clause. Having studied the clause and its 
history for almost thirty years, I have come to the conclusion that we should 
just do away with the doctrine of regulatory takings altogether. 
 Although I have only recently come to that conclusion as a matter of 
constitutional jurisprudence, I have consistently argued that the regulatory 
takings doctrine is inconsistent with the original understanding. My student 
note3 made that point and was cited for that proposition by Justice 
Blackmun in his dissent in the 1992 case Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal 
Council.4 When I began researching that note, I was not at all focused on 
the question of whether the original understanding included regulatory 
takings. I was concerned, instead, with discovering why the Bill of Rights 
included a Takings Clause. As I explored the original understanding and 
how the Takings Clause came to be part of the Bill of Rights, I found that, 
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 1. J. Peter Byrne, Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center. 
 2. John Echeverria, Professor of Law, Vermont Law School. 
 3. William Michael Treanor, Note, The Origins and Original Significance of the Just 
Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment, 94 YALE L.J. 694 (1985). 
 4. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1056, 1057 n.23, 1059 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).  
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when first adopted, the Takings Clause only prohibited physical seizures. 
My editor said, “Do you know that your note shows that the regulatory 
takings doctrine is not grounded in the original understanding?” It was like 
a light bulb going off in my head. Until then, I had not realized the primary 
practical significance of my research. 
 The two major pieces that I’ve written about the Takings Clause were 
my student note and then, as Peter said, about fifteen years ago I wrote a 
large piece in the Columbia Law Review on the early history of the Takings 
Clause.5 The thesis of that piece was that the best way to understand the 
Takings Clause was that it protected against political-process failure; that is 
essentially the approach that Justice Stevens took in takings cases,6 looking 
at whether there was a failure of the political process through which a 
politically powerless group was victimized. In the past fifteen years, 
however, I have reached the conclusion that the whole doctrine of 
regulatory takings is problematic because it is fundamentally incoherent and 
because it is impossible to come up with any manageable standards. The 
Stop the Beach case7 illustrates that point. While scholars can debate the 
legitimacy of the judicial takings doctrine, the fundamental problem is that, 
once you move beyond physical seizures of property by government 
officials, it is not clear where you draw the line or what lines you can come 
up with. We should go back to the idea that the Takings Clause is just about 
physical seizures, that it’s just about eminent domain, and not about 
regulation.  
 So, if I’m making the argument, as a constitutional law scholar, there 
basically are three standard hooks that you have: You look at text, you look 
at original meaning, and you look at the case law. So what is the text? 
“[N]or shall private property be taken for public use, without just 
compensation.”8 The critical word for me in that text is “taken.” The word 
connotes some kind of physical seizure. The example that I used when I 
was speaking to this group the first time was, if I were to say to my 
daughter Katherine—who was then about one and a half and is now 
fourteen—if my daughter Katherine was playing ball and I said, “Katherine, 
don’t play ball in the house,” unless she was deeply steeped in the property-
rights movement, Katherine would not say that I had taken her ball. I would 
have deprived her of the use that was of most meaning to her—playing with 
the ball in the house—but in any kind of common parlance I would not 
                                                                                                             
 5. William Michael Treanor, The Original Understanding of the Takings Clause and the 
Political Process, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 782 (1995). 
 6. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1061 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 7. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 130 S. Ct. 2592 (2010). 
 8. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
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have taken her ball from her. The concept of “taking” now and in the 
eighteenth century connotes some kind of physical occupation, physical 
domination: It’s a physicalist term. And that’s consistent with the original 
understanding. 
 The Takings Clause, of all the clauses in the Bill of Rights, is unique. 
First of all, it’s not in any of the colonial charters. When the United States 
were colonies, most of the colonies had charters, but none of those charters 
had a Takings Clause. Similarly, the Takings Clause is not in the Magna 
Carta.9 It emerges for the first time in 1777 in the Vermont Constitution, so 
it’s very appropriate to be talking about that here, in a conference co-
sponsored by Vermont Law School. The territory that we now think of as 
Vermont was originally in New Hampshire. And then the crown shifted it to 
New York, which invalidated the land titles of everybody in Vermont. That 
ultimately led to rebellion and to the creation of a separate state. So 
Vermont—which was in 1777 not a state but was fighting for its 
independence—drafted a constitution and its drafters came up with the first 
Takings Clause. We don’t have any legislative history of it, and we don’t 
have any early state cases interpreting the Clause, but it seems to me that it 
grew out of this experience of massive expropriation of land grants. So 
again, a very physical seizure: essentially an eminent domain-type seizure. 
 There are two other constitutional documents that had takings clauses 
before the Bill of Rights was adopted: Massachusetts, which seems to have 
taken it from Vermont when they drafted their constitution three years later, 
and the Northwest Ordinance. The Northwest Ordinance, to the extent that 
we have any evidence of its original meaning—and we don’t have any 
legislative history—seems to have grown out of a concern about 
impressments during the Revolutionary War. The first decision interpreting 
the clause says that it’s about seizure of property for military purposes.  
 Then, we have the Bill of Rights. When the Constitution was first 
proposed, states proposed dozens and dozens of amendments. When 
Madison drafted the Bill of Rights, he essentially picked and chose from 
this group with one exception: the Takings Clause. The Takings Clause is 
the only clause in the Bill of Rights that was not requested by a state 
ratifying convention. It’s only there because of Madison. We don’t have 
any legislative history. So in the congressional debates we don’t have any 
evidence of what it meant; they didn’t talk about it. It’s not talked about in 
                                                                                                             
 9. The provision in the Magna Carta that most resembles the Takings Clause is Article 28, 
which states: “No constable or other royal official shall take corn or other movable goods from any man 
without immediate payment, unless the seller voluntarily offers postponement of this.” MAGNA CARTA 
art. XXVIII. The provision is limited in scope, covering only taking of movable goods. Most relevant to 
this Keynote Address, it pertains only to physical seizures. 
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the state ratifying conventions on the Bill of Rights. It doesn’t seem to have 
been that important to anyone. The best evidence that we have as to what its 
original meaning is from St. George Tucker. St. George Tucker is the 
author of the first constitutional law treatise, which came out in 1803; he 
was a Virginia jurist, also a politician. He wrote that the Clause was 
“probably intended to restrain the arbitrary and oppressive mode of 
obtaining supplies for the army, and other public uses, by impressment, as 
was too frequently practised during the revolutionary war.”10 So again, the 
most on-point evidence that we have from this period is that it’s about 
seizure of goods by the army. Madison has an essay called On Property, 
which he wrote as a critique of Hamilton’s economic policies. Madison 
wrote: 
 
 If there be a government then which prides itself in 
maintaining the inviolability of property; which provides that 
none shall be taken directly even for public use without 
indemnification to the owner, and yet . . . which indirectly 
violates their property, in their actual possessions, in the labor 
that acquires their daily subsistence . . . such a government is not 
a pattern for the United States.11 
 
Here, he is contrasting the Takings Clause, which prohibits direct takings, 
with the evils of the Hamiltonian economic policy, which are regulatory 
policies; he is arguing that Hamilton’s policies violate the spirit of the 
Takings Clause, but he is not contending that they violate the Takings 
Clause itself. He’s contrasting the direct, which is the Takings Clause, with 
the indirect, which is the Hamiltonian policies. Similarly, that notion that 
the Takings Clause only prohibits direct seizures is reflected in the early 
cases. In 1871, the Supreme Court in the Legal Tender Cases summed up 
these early cases: 
 
[The Takings Clause] has always been understood as referring 
only to a direct appropriation, and not to consequential injuries 
resulting from the exercise of lawful power. . . . A new tariff, an 
embargo, a draft, or a war may inevitably bring upon individuals 
great losses; may, indeed, render valuable property almost 
valueless. They may destroy the worth of contracts. But whoever 
supposed that, because of this, a tariff could not be changed, or a 
                                                                                                             
 10. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE & ST. GEORGE TUCKER, COMMENTARIES 305–06 (1803). 
 11. 14 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 267–68 (Robert A. Rutland et al. eds., 1983) 
(emphasis omitted).  
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non-intercourse act, or an embargo, be enacted, or a war be 
declared?12 
 
And that overwhelmingly captures the early case law. 
 There are a couple of cases in the Civil War era that go beyond 
physical seizure, really only a handful, a few cases involving revocation of 
franchises, the earliest of which I found was in 1834. Chancellor Kent, who 
was strongly committed to property rights, has a case from 1816 and a few 
subsequent cases in which consequential damages are found to be takings 
and there are, again, a handful of other consequential damage cases that are 
takings. But the bottom line is the kind of things that we look at today as 
regulatory takings—regulations—are not recognized as violations of the 
Takings Clause in the pre-Civil War era. 
 The one other thing that’s interesting and relevant about the original 
understanding, and Madison’s intent especially, is that he thinks that the 
Takings Clause would require compensation in the case of abolition. Which 
is striking because it goes directly to the Kelo13 point: What does public use 
mean for the original generation? Does it mean public benefit? Or does it 
mean public control? Madison, in a letter that he writes about the Takings 
Clause, writes to a friend that if there is emancipation, Congress will have 
to authorize compensation under the Takings Clause. So, for Madison, his 
understanding of the Takings Clause reflects this conception of public 
benefit rather than public control. That was the norm in the abolition era. In 
the pre-Civil War era, when the northern states abolished slavery, they 
always provided compensation.  
 So how do we get a regulatory takings doctrine? Originally you have 
two boxes. You have the takings box and the due process box. And the 
challenges to the police power are brought under the due process box. So 
when we look in the post-Civil War era, the case law is exemplified by 
Mugler v. Kansas. Mugler arose after Kansas went dry; and there was a 
challenge by a beer-maker to the loss of value of the plant. The Court 
rejected the challenge. Justice Harlan wrote: 
 
A prohibition simply upon the use of property for purposes that 
are declared, by valid legislation, to be injurious to the health, 
morals, or safety of the community, cannot, in any just sense, be 
deemed a taking, or an appropriation of property for the public 
benefit. . . . The power which the States have of prohibiting such 
use by individuals of their property as will be prejudicial to the 
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 13. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005). 
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health, the morals, or the safety of the public, is not—and, 
consistently with the existence and safety of organized society, 
cannot be—burdened with the condition that the State must 
compensate such individual owners for pecuniary losses they 
may sustain, by reason of their not being permitted, by a noxious 
use of their property, to inflict injury upon the community.14 
 
So, again, there are two boxes in the early case law. There’s the takings 
box, which is about physical seizure; if the government physically seizes 
property, it has to pay compensation. And then there’s the due process box, 
and if the activity is noxious, if it violates health and safety, the government 
can regulate it, and it can destroy the value of it. But if it’s not acting to 
protect health, safety, and welfare, it can’t regulate. So you’ve got these two 
boxes: the due process box and the takings box. 
 And then what happens that makes it confusing—and that really is a 
critical step in the development of regulatory takings—is the case of Munn 
v. Illinois. Munn v. Illinois is a case in which the Supreme Court says that it 
doesn’t violate due process for the state to regulate grain storage, the rates 
charged by the owner of a granary, because it’s a business “affected with a 
public interest.”15 That all of a sudden creates a third box. So you’ve got the 
physical seizure box, the takings clause; you’ve got the health and safety 
box, which is the due process box; and now you’ve got businesses “affected 
with a public interest.” Nobody says the granary is noxious, and yet it’s 
permissible for the state to regulate it. So then the question becomes, if the 
state can regulate it, can it regulate it without regard to the effect of the 
regulation on the value of the property? That’s contested. And then the 
Supreme Court ultimately, in Smyth v. Ames, establishes a test for 
businesses affected with the public interest, that rates cannot be set 
“unreasonably low.”16 So that’s the test: “unreasonably low.” It’s a due 
process case, but it’s understood that we are essentially taking the takings 
principal and embodying it in due process. If the rates are set too low, then 
compensation must be owed.  
 Now, you have three boxes. You’ve got due process, classic due 
process: police power. You’ve got takings: physical seizure. Finally, you’ve 
got the Due Process Clause with the takings principal embodied in it for 
businesses affected with a public interest. The contours of the last box are 
heatedly debated by the Court in the early part of the twentieth century. In 
conceptualizing what a business affected with a public interest was, there 
                                                                                                             
 14. Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 668–69 (1887). 
 15. Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S 113, 130 (1876). 
 16. Smyth v. Ames, 169 U.S. 466, 526 (1898).  
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was a liberal take and a conservative take. The liberals on the Court viewed 
that category expansively and the conservatives viewed it narrowly. And 
then there was a debate about what was noxious. The liberals viewed the 
category of harmful activity expansively, and the conservatives viewed it 
narrowly. Lochner17 is a case in which, for example, the liberals and 
conservatives are split on whether this is a legitimate health and safety 
regulation. So you’ve got those three boxes.  
 Holmes thinks that this is incoherent. He thinks the idea of businesses 
affected with a public interest just doesn’t make any sense. As a matter of 
fact, after the Pennsylvania Coal18 case he says, in another decision, in 
dissent, that the idea of businesses affected with a public interest “is little 
more than a fiction intended to beautify what is disagreeable to the 
sufferers.”19 He thinks it’s an incoherent doctrine. In his decisions, he 
pushed first for an expansive reading of what businesses “affected with a 
public interest” were, but then in Pennsylvania Coal he abandons the 
category and essentially applies the business “affected with a public 
interest” test to regulations more generally, not limiting it to businesses 
affected with a public interest. In Pennsylvania Coal you have a split, so 
Holmes is coming up with this new test and Brandeis in dissent is taking 
what is the standard liberal take on the Court: The underlying activity is 
noxious, this is a health and safety regulation, and therefore the statute is 
okay. Pennsylvania Coal is brilliant, and it’s also unworkable.  
 The Pennsylvania Coal test is in large part a reflection of Holmes and 
his love of aphorisms. I wrote a piece in the Georgetown Law Journal about 
Pennsylvania Coal, which I called Jam for Justice Holmes,20 that developed 
this point. When Justice Holmes was a little boy, his father, who was the 
great doctor and man of letters, Oliver Wendell Holmes, Senior, used to 
encourage Oliver Wendell Holmes, Junior, to say clever things by giving 
him a teaspoon of jam at the breakfast table if he said something clever. 
That then became an addiction. Pennsylvania Coal, rather than being a 
workable legal principal, is a reflection of his love of logical rigor, the idea 
that businesses “affected with a public interest” is an unmanageable and 
unintelligible category, and the test is really about his love of aphorisms. 
But then, strikingly, it has almost no influence on the Court, originally.  
                                                                                                             
 17. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
 18. Penn. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922). 
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 Take Euclid,21 for example; it’s just after Pennsylvania Coal. You 
would think that Euclid would apply the Pennsylvania Coal test, but the test 
is not in Euclid. It’s not in Nectow,22 which is the Cambridge zoning case 
decided shortly thereafter. Again, you would think that Pennsylvania Coal 
would have been central to the decision. And then strikingly, just in terms 
of the way in which it totally disappears from the legal culture from 1935 to 
1958, Pennsylvania Coal is not cited in a single majority opinion. It’s a 
very idiosyncratic Holmes opinion at the time. It reflects his beliefs, but it 
doesn’t have any legs. But then, when the Supreme Court returns to the land 
use area, returns to zoning, which it starts to do in the 1960s, Pennsylvania 
Coal is almost the only case out there which can be worked in to reflect 
modern categories. The Brandeisian notion of going in and finding out 
which regulations are health and safety regulations doesn’t work in a 
modern regulatory state. 
 The basic pre-Pennsylvania Coal template did not work. The concept 
of businesses “affected with a public interest” doesn’t make sense in a 
modern regulatory state where every business is really conceptualized as 
being affected with a public interest. The scrutiny of what constitutes a 
health and safety regulation doesn’t work either because there’s such a 
broad category of regulation that had been adopted in the post-New Deal 
era. So the Court, almost for want of anything else, starts to embrace 
Pennsylvania Coal, which it then re-conceptualizes as a takings decision 
because substantive due process in this period also has a bad name, so even 
though it’s a substantive due process case, it gets re-conceptualized as a 
takings decision and then it becomes the anchor decision in a case like, for 
example, Penn Central.23  
 Think about that path. Think about what’s happened to the Takings 
Clause. You have the original understanding, which is that it’s just about 
physical seizures. You then move to the businesses “affected with a public 
interest” test, [and] you then move to the Pennsylvania Coal test, and then 
you re-conceptualize that as a Takings Clause test when it’s not originally a 
Takings Clause test. That’s a very tortured history.  
 Again, if you’re thinking about what the anchors are that we use to 
interpret a constitutional clause, we look to text, we look to original 
understanding, we look to precedent. The text is really about physical 
seizures, the original understanding is about physical seizures, and the 
precedent is tortured and reflects a dramatic shifting over time. The modern 
case law, similarly, is struggling to come up with some kind of coherent 
                                                                                                             
 21. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926). 
 22. Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183 (1928). 
 23. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978). 
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principle. Certainly since Penn Central we’ve been struggling and have not 
been able to come up with any kind of coherent principle that elicits any 
kind of support. All of those things, I think, point to the need for a return to 
the original understanding.  
 So, if you are somebody committed to the original understanding, or if 
you’re a textualist like Justice Scalia or Justice Thomas, you really should 
embrace this idea of the Takings Clause being limited to physical seizures. 
And if you are applying normal constitutional metrics, it has become time 
to recognize that the regulatory takings doctrine is unworkable and doesn’t 
provide any manageable standards. And so again, that would lead us back 
to the original understanding and to the text. That isn’t to say that there are 
no constitutional hooks concerning constitutional protection of property that 
are worth consideration. Justice Kennedy’s attention to the Due Process 
Clause may be one way that we should be thinking about looking at land 
use regulations; it in fact catches our intuitions much better than the 
Takings Clause. But the best way for us to interpret the Takings Clause 
moving forward is to return to the original understanding. 
 It’s a privilege for me to be able to be in a dialogue with a group like 
this. This is something I’ve been thinking about for a long time, and I have 
not had the opportunity to work through these ideas in a setting like this. I 
want to thank John, and I want to thank Peter for giving me this 




 I’ve always had a question about this piece of yours from Columbia, 
which I love and I think I’ve cited in everything I’ve ever written about this. 
I do have one low-hanging question about emancipation. I think this 
characterization of the Takings Clause as about protecting slaveholders and 
compromise is fascinating and compelling as a descriptive account, but I’ve 
also wondered why it is that emancipation would have been seen as 
physical expropriation in the way that you suggest the Takings Clause 
would be limited to. And at the point at which something like emancipation 
is a physical taking in your view, isn’t that in fact indistinguishable from 
many forms of regulatory taking as we view the term today? In other words, 
what does the fact that emancipation fits in the physical expropriations box 
for you tell us about how broadly that original understanding of 
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Answer: 
 I think that’s a very good question. One of the things that I argued in 
the Columbia piece was that this was a driver for Madison, and it’s not 
something that he talks about publicly. The letter is private, but he very 
much thinks that there’s a real challenge to slaveholding in the South from 
the structure of the federal government. It’s a particular concern for him 
because James Wilson, in the Pennsylvania Ratifying Convention, says that 
under the Constitution, Congress will have the power to abolish slavery 
after 1808. The Virginians are all horrified by this because that’s not the 
way they read the Constitution, and Madison drafts the Takings Clause to 
require that emancipation will require compensation. The early case law is 
about classic physical seizures and primarily eminent domain. The gray 
area is about consequential damages. Then the question is: To what extent 
does emancipation fit within that box? I would say that it’s different, that 
it’s more like eminent domain than it is like regulation because, first of all 
(it’s very tough to talk about slavery because the concepts that they use in 
talking about people are the language of property), it’s about taking a 
person who is another person’s property and physically taking that person 
away from the control of the slaveholder and emancipating that person. It is 
very much a physical seizure, a taking away from the slaveholder and 
letting the person be on her own. So that’s why I think it fits. It’s very close 




 I am a farmer as well as a lawyer. One of the things that I’ve always 
heard is that Jefferson really was very much opposed to Madison’s concept, 
because Jefferson [had] seen the feudal system in Europe. Seeing the serfs, 
seeing a vassal having his property taken away from him, [Jefferson] never 
wanted that to happen. That was the foundation of the dispute between 
Jefferson and Madison. Not so much slavery, but because of what they had 
seen in the feudal system. Clearly slavery got into it, but it was the whole 
feudal system that drove Jefferson: No, the government doesn’t have any 
right to take your property at all. And the Fifth Amendment was developed 
as a consequence to get around Jefferson’s view. 
 
Answer: 
 It’s interesting. Madison is the one who’s the pro-private-property 
rights champion of the founding generation. Actually, Jefferson has much 
more the sense—which he expresses at various times, for example when 
he’s ambassador to France—that inequitable property distributions have to 
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be addressed. Some of his writings reflect a view that is sympathetic to 
property redistribution in a way that is alien to Madison. Of all of the 
people in this generation, Madison is the one who is the most concerned 
about private property; much more than Jefferson. That concern leads him 
to propose the Takings Clause. One additional point that bears noting is that 
the Takings Clause shows up in the French Rights of Man, which is a total 
puzzle to everyone because it’s not a French right and historians ask: Where 
did they get it? What seems to be the case is that Lafayette drafted a large 
part of the Rights of Man and that Jefferson suggested to him that he 
include the provision; there is no other apparent source. This is the only 
evidence that I know that suggests that Jefferson was supportive of the 
Takings Clause itself.  
 
Question: 
 I know your presentation is on the history of the Takings Clause, but 
would you care to speculate on whether the Supreme Court’s denial of cert 
in every case except for Stop the Beach in the last seven years, including 
some cases where they could really develop the regulatory takings doctrine, 
including the Penn Central doctrine. Would you care to speculate on 
whether they, perhaps, are embracing some of your ideas that there really 
shouldn’t be any regulatory takings and they’ve gone off on this adventure, 
and it’s really turned out badly for them? 
 
Answer: 
 Well, I’d like to think that that was right. I would think at some level 
there’s a sense that it’s just so difficult, the line drawing, [and] that it’s an 
area they don’t want to be involved in. In some ways it’s kind of the 
aftermath of Lucas, in some ways that’s the high water mark of the 
conservative wing of the court. It winds up being a very narrow decision. 
It’s hard to say what its intellectual underpinnings are. I think that the 
Epstein takings position . . . is intellectually coherent, but clearly there are 
not five votes on the Court to go that far. I think to some extent the Court’s 
avoidance of the issue in recent years may be the sense that there’s no 
intellectually defensible position that the conservative wing feels happy 
with. That’s a good question. 
 
Question: 
 One of the reasons why supporters of property rights have focused so 
much on the Takings Clause has been the relative atrophying of the 
Contract and substantive Due Process Clauses. Would [your curtailing of] 
takings imply that we would revitalize these other clauses? 




 I think it’s worth looking at the Due Process Clause. I don’t think the 
Contracts Clause should be revitalized. This is actually one of my favorite 
factoids so I will just say it. It’s not directly relevant. The Contracts Clause, 
I think, is the only clause in the Constitution that’s actually voted down in 
Philadelphia. So when the Contracts Clause is introduced, initially, it gets 
voted down. And then, fascinatingly, at the very end of the convention, all 
of the clauses of the Constitution go to the Committee of Style. So this is 
really right at the very end. Gouverneur Morris is the main draftsperson of 
the committee. He says at one point, “with this pen I wrote the 
Constitution.” One of the things that’s amazing is the way in which he 
transformed the Constitution at the very end of the deliberations and 
nobody pays attention, because they’re just exhausted. So many of the 
things that we think of as bedrock principals of constitutional law: the basic 
structure of Article One, Article Two, Article Three; . . . the differences in 
the Vesting Clause—between the Executive Vesting Clause, which gives all 
powers to the president, and the Congressional Vesting Clause, which only 
gives to Congress the congressional powers herein granted; “We the people 
of the United States”—that’s all the handiwork of Gouverneur Morris. 
Some of the changes from the Committee were subject to debate, but others 
were not. And one of the changes added at the end is the Contracts Clause.  
 The Contracts Clause was originally voted down when it was first 
proposed in the Convention; it then emerges, however, out of the 
Committee of Style, and there’s no debate on it. I don’t know of any 
evidence that indicates that anyone on the floor (other than the committee 
members) was aware of the change. But if you look, if you go to Farrand’s 
debates, it is breathtaking to compare the document that goes into the 
Committee of Style and the one that comes out of the Committee of Style. I 
think, from an originalist point-of-view in terms of the larger principles of 
the era, the Contract Clause is not, I think, a fundamental principle for this 
period. I would tend to give it a fairly narrow reading. You obviously can’t 
read it out of the Constitution. It’s there, but I would not look at it as the 
handle to resolve these kinds of questions. I think due process is something 
that is a better hook. Again, I say that even though I haven’t worked out 
what that would mean, and I don’t think Justice Kennedy has worked out 
what that would mean. It is actually one of the problems that you get in 
constitutional law where the right hook is abandoned, and there’s this sense 
that we still have to find some way to deal with the problem the clause 
addressed, and then you come up with a text that just doesn’t work for the 
problem. So I think it’s appropriate for us to revisit due process and think 
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where the appropriate due process line would be. Again, I haven’t worked 
out where that would be. That’s my inclination. 
 
Question: 
 Justice Scalia recently compared Kelo to the Dred Scott decision, 




 I would disagree. Kelo has, obviously—and everybody in this room 
knows that—hit an emotional chord. My secretary at Fordham had an anti-
Kelo poster over her desk, I think partly to tweak me. The case has 
generated this incredible outcry. One of the things that’s striking to me is to 
think why that’s the case because it seems to me, [and] I’ve talked to Justice 
Stevens about this, it was so well-established in terms of precedent—
Berman v. Parker,24 Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff25—it was a very 
well-established case. So the idea of applying the precedent and treating 
that as a departure from precedent has always puzzled me. The case reflects 
the underlying view that majoritarian decisionmakers make decisions about 
property and that’s appropriate, and some of the decisions may be bad and 
some of them may be good, but that’s what a democracy is about. It seems 
to me that this is well within my sense of the way constitutional law should 
work. I look at the dominant view in the early case law of what public use is 
as being public benefit, which again, supports the majority opinion. And 
again, the Madisonian view that the abolition of slavery would fall within 
the Takings Clause is an example of public use being public benefit. So 
Kelo is consistent with the original understanding. 
                                                                                                             
 24. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954). 
 25. Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984).  
